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Toward the Restorative Constitution:
A Restorative Justice Critique of
Anti-Gang Public Nuisance
Injunctions
BY JOAN W. HOWARTH*
INTRODUCTION
Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on
lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at all
hours of the day and night. They display a casual contempt for
notions of law, order, and decency-openly drinking, smoking
dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting cocaine laid out in
neat lines on the hoods of residents' cars. The people who live
in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity,
profanity, brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing
in the streets. Gang members take over sidewalks, driveways,
carports, apartment parking areas, and impede traffic on the
public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar.
Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and
battery, vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace
How should we respond to young people, gang members,
terrorizing a neighborhood in this way? San Jose prosecutors
responded by obtaining and enforcing a broad injunction against the
Varrio Sureno Treces and Varrio Sureno Locos gangs and their
Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. I thank Ayana Cuevas (UC Davis,
2000) for excellent research assistance, Christine Pagano and Maria Ontiveros for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this work, and the faculty at the William S. Boyd School
of Law, UNLV, for a thoughtful discussion of many of these ideas. This project was
finished while I was the Scholar in Residence at the Boalt Center for Social Justice, an
opportunity for which I am very grateful.
1. People ex reL Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100 (1997) (describing the
Rocksprings neighborhood of San Jose and justifying the anti-gang public nuisance
injunction ordered to protect the residents of Rocksprings), cert. denied sub nom.
Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).
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members, based on the finding that the gangs' activities constituted a
public nuisance to the people of Rocksprings.2 California prosecutors
have sought such anti-gang public nuisance injunctions since 1987.
Their constitutionality was in doubt for ten years until People ex rel.
Gallo v. Acuna," in which the California Supreme Court upheld the
injunction imposed to protect the residents of Rocksprings. The
California court found that the needs of a community overtaken by
criminality justified bypassing the criminal justice system.5 The
Acuna opinion champions the anti-gang injunction as a lawful and
important means to hold the gang members accountable and restore
community to Rocksprings.
This Article critiques anti-gang public nuisance injunctions
through the lens of restorative justice principles. The rhetorical
justification for anti-gang injunctions is strikingly similar to the
rhetoric of the restorative justice movement. Restorative justice rests
on the tenets that any crime is injurious, and that the best response is
one that heals the injuries caused to the victim, the community, and
the offender.6  The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions share
2. See id. The two targeted gangs were variously known as Varrio Sureno Town,
Varrio Sureno Treces (VST), or Varrio Sureno Locos (VSL).
3. See Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal
Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 Nw. U.L. REv. 213,215,217 (1994); see also infra text
accompanying notes 50-93.
4. 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997).
5. For commentary on Acuna, see Raffy Astvasadoorian, Note, California's Two-
Prong Attack Against Gang Crime and Violence: The Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act and Anti-Gang Injunctions, 19 J. Juv. L. 272 (1998); Rebecca Allen, Note,
People ex reL Gallo v. Acuna: (Ab)using California's Nuisance Law to Control Gangs, 25
W. ST. U. L. REv. 257 (1998); Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local
Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 477 (1993);
Bergen Herd, Note, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-related Problems in California
after People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 29
(1998); Edson McClellan, Casenote, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Pulling in the Nets on
Criminal Street Gangs, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343 (1998); Julie Gannon Shoop, Gang
Warfare: Legal Battle Pits Personal Liberty Against Public Safety, 34 TRIAL 12 (Mar.
1998); Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public
Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REv. 409
(1999); Mindy Yaeger, Note, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Cities Allowed a New Weapon
in Their Arsenal for the Crackdown on Gangs, 19 WHITrIER L. REv. 595 (1998); Randall
Kennedy, Guilty by Association, AM. PROSPEC, May-June 1997, at 66; Daniel J.
Sharfstein, Gangbusters: Enjoining the Boys in the 'Hood, AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1997,
at 58; see also Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1129, 1173-76
(1999) (citing Acuna as an example of constitutional interpretation successfully
acknowledging community needs through contextual "Tailoring").
6. The Office of Juvenile Justice of the Department of Justice sets out the principles
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significant similarities with typical restorative justice programs: both
are deviations from traditional criminal court (or even juvenile court)
models; both privilege participation of affected communities; both re-
conceive lawbreaking as injury; and both, at least in theory, are based
on notions of redress of those injuries. Further, both provoke serious
opposition from civil libertarians.7 Fundamentally, though, the anti-
gang public nuisance injunctions undermine the promise of
restorative justice as deeply as they weaken traditional rights-based
protections, and the betrayal of the goals of restorative justice may be
of even greater consequence.
Part I of this Article describes the fundamental principles of
restorative justice, referencing some specific projects, to introduce the
vocabulary and values of restorative justice. Part II describes anti-
gang public nuisance injunctions. Part III critiques the anti-gang
public nuisance injunctions using the restorative justice lens. Building
on that critique, Part IV describes restorative justice for Rocksprings.
Part V begins an argument for a Restorative Constitution, whereby
constitutional protections-re-imagined as affirmative, community-
based values, rather than merely defensive individual-based rights-
can accommodate and even embrace restorative justice goals, themes,
and programs.
I. Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is a modern movement8 with ancient roots9
of restorative justice as follows:
"Crime is injury. Crime hurts individual victims, communities, and juvenile offenders and
creates an obligation to make things right. All parties should be a part of the response to
the crime, including the victim if he or she wishes, the community, and the juvenile
offender. The victim's perspective is crucial to deciding how to repair the harm caused by
the crime. Accountability for the juvenile offender means accepting responsibility and
acting to repair the harm done. The community is responsible for the well-being of all its
members, including both the victim and the offender."
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MODEL 5
(1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 8-49 (describing restorative justice programs
and principles).
7. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal
Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994) (libertarian critique of some
restorative justice programs); Werdegar, supra note 5 (libertarian critique of anti-gang
public nuisance injunctions).
8. See Gordon Bazemore, Beyond Retribution: Creative Retribution, in
RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds., 1975) (crediting
Albert Eglash with having introduced the term "restorative justice"); Gordon Bazemore,
Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration: Restorative Justice and Earned
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and adherents around the globe." Restorative justice advocates invite
us to reject the basics of the criminal justice adversarial system, of
crime as violation of law, and of the fundamental distinctions between
criminal and civil law." According to John Braithwaite, the core
values of restorative justice are "healing rather than hurting, moral
learning, community participation and community caring, respectful
dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and making amends."'"
Braithwaite describes restorative justice as "a process of bringing
together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and
having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime.
The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore
communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just."'3 As so
described, restorative justice is the most hopeful, least cynical, and
least co-opted aspect of the victims' right movement." Braithwaite
Redemption, in Civic REPENTANCE, at 85 n. 14 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1999).
9. See Elmar G. M. Weitekamp, The History of Restorative Justice, in RESTORING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 75, 102 (Lode Walgrave & Gordon Bazemore eds., 1999).
10. See, e.g., Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law - A Redemptive
Opportunity, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L. J. 1583 (2000) (discussing restorative criminal defense
practice); Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1651 (2000) (advocating for restorative justice by prosecutors); Leena Kurki,
Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235 (2000)
(describing roots, practices, and evaluations of restorative justice programs in the U.S.,
Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere); David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal
Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why is It so Hard To Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1663 (2000) (advocating for restorative justice by prosecutors); David M. Lerman,
Restoring Dignity, Effecting Justice, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 20, 20-21 (Fall 1999) (describing
successful restorative justice processes in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa); Kent Roach,
Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671, 706-15 (1999)
(optimistic assessment of "circles," non-punitive model of restorative justice for U.S. and
Canada).
11. See Gordon Bazemore in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at 45; Gordon
Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court:
Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 296,298
(1995) ("A restorative model would expand less punitive, less costly, and less stigmatizing
sanctioning methods by involving the community and victims in sanctioning processes,
thereby elevating the role of victims and victimized communities and giving priority to
reparation, direct offender accountability to victims, and conflict resolution.").
12. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (1999).
13. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized.: Realistic or
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727,1743 (1999).
14. For leading discussions of victims' rights in criminal proceedings, see Lynne
Henderson, Crime & Punishment: Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596
(1996), reviewing GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995); Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 937 (1985). For a description of restorative justice as an outgrowth of the victims'
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and Philip Pettit explain that the remedy to the' problem of victim
irrelevance in criminal prosecutions would seem to be to give back to
the victim the particular crime." In restorative justice principles, both
the victim and the offender are necessary participants in a process of
making amends. 6 Thus restorative justice is directly at odds with the
adversary system; a system to find or construct common ground is not
an adversary system.
Restorative justice programs address a variety of criminal
behaviors around the globe. Noteworthy processes identified as
restorative justice initiatives include the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in South Africa,17 victim-offender mediation and
reconciliation programs in the United States and elsewhere, 8 Navaho
Peacemaking, 9 and family conferences in the United States, Canada,
and New Zealand." Within United States legal systems, restorative
rights movement, see Brown, supra note 7.
15. John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Comment: Republican Criminology and Victim
Advocacy, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 765,771 (1994).
16. Cf. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1016 (1999) ("an apology is a 'commodity' which only the offender can produce"; the
,market' for apology is monopolistic-the injured party cannot get that apology elsewhere.
The same applies to forgiveness: It is a commodity best obtained from the injured party.").
17. See, e.g., Abdullah Omar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Accounting
for the Past, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 5, 14 (1998) (identifying Commission as
restorative justice project); see generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47,49 (1997) (analyzing Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
18. See MARK UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
19. See Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation's Peacemaker Division: An Integrated,
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 297 (1999/2000);
Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999) (placing Navajo Peacemaking within restorative
justice); Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality
and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69 (Burt
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES] at 157,
160 (describing traditional Navajo law as "a healing process that either restores good
relationships among people or, if they do not have good relations to begin with, fosters
and nourishes a healthy environment."). For a caution about transferring Navaho
Peacemaking principles or practices to non-Indian systems, see Carole E. Goldberg,
Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH.
L. REV. 1003 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Mark Umbreit & Howard Zehr, Restorative Family Group Conferences:
Differing Models and Guidelines for Practice, FED. PROBATION (Sept. 1996); Frederick
W.M. McElrea, The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model for Use with Adults, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 69. For discussions of specific
restorative justice projects, see Curt Taylor Griffiths, Sanctioning and Healing: Restorative
Justice in Canadian Aboriginal Communities, 20 INTER'L. J. OF COMP. AND APPLIED
CRIM. JUST. 195 (1996); Gord Richardson, Burt Galaway & Michelle Joubert, The
Summer 20001 721
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justice principles have been translated into program initiatives
primarily in the juvenile justice context.2' Juvenile justice appears to
be a prime site for restorative justice experiments because of the now
diminished but still relatively greater emphasis on rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders, and the associated hope of preventing juveniles
from becoming entrenched in the criminal justice system.'
Juvenile justice conferencing in New Zealand provides a model
of restorative justice with particularly widespread acceptance and
influence. In this model, once wrongdoing is admitted, a conference
is convened, generally moderated by a police officer, with both the
offender and the victim. Each of the major participants, the offender
and the victim, is invited to bring to the conference the people most
able to provide support. In other words, family or friends of both
participate. Conferencing has succeeded in spite of strong resistance
from lawyers, and has gained equally strong support from the police.
The offender hears directly from the victim about the injury the
offender has caused and what is needed to make amends. The
"community" is represented not only by the police officer, but also by
the people brought to the conference by both the victim and the
offender. When conferencing works, the presence of the victim's
supporters enables the victim to confront and communicate with the
offender, and the presence of the offender's supporters enables the
offender to accept responsibility and be held accountable for not only
the original injury, but whatever restorative remedy is agreed upon.'
Proponents of restorative justice make both moral and pragmatic
Restorative Resolutions Project: An Alternative to Incarceration, id. at 209; Barry Stuart,
Circle Sentencing in Canada: A Partnership of the Community and the Criminal Justice
System, id. at 291.
21. See, e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 11; Amanda Paye, Communities
Taking Control of Crime: Incorporating the Conferencing Model into the United States
Juvenile Justice System, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 161 (1999). For an excellent
introduction to the use of restorative justice for crime committed by juveniles, see OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PLANNING, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BALANCED
AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: A FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (August 1997) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
22. See RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH
CRIME (G. Bazemore & L. Walgrave eds., 1999); Gordon Bazemore, Three Paradigms for
Juvenile Justice, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 37; Brown, supra
note 7, at 1265 n. 70; Frederick W. M. McElreas, The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model
for Use with Adults, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 69. But see
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REv. 965, 1095 (1995) (cautioning that restorative justice might be
simply the "latest fad" in juvenile justice).
23. See Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 15-17; McElreas, supra note 22, at 69.
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arguments for it. Many argue that restorative justice is more effective
in making us safe from violence than current regimes of retribution.4
John Braithwaite points out that "the research literature of
victimology instructs us that it is incorrect to expect that tougher
sentences will leave crime victims, the police, or citizens any more
satisfied with the justice system."'  On a more theoretical level, some
proponents claim that restorative justice addresses deconstructionist
critiques of justice by recognizing the offender and the victim in their
individuality. 6  Important, and strong theoretical support for
restorative justice comes from republican 7 and communitarian
thinkers.
Braithwaite has argued that "[r]estorative justice became a
global social movement in the 1990s as a result of learning from
indigenous practices of restorative justice the ways in which
individualistic Western victim-offender mediation was impoverished. 29
Braithwaite suggests that the "radically communitarian" traditions of
the New Zealand Maori and North American Native people lead to
more effective restorative practices,' that "material reparation [is]
much less important than emotional or symbolic reparation,"3 and
that justice must be "intertwined with love and caring."'32
Liberal, feminist, and critical race critics, however, express
24. For discussions of the theoretical underpinnings of the efficacy of restorative
justice, see, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737-1742,- see also John 0. Haley, Apology
and Pardon: Learning from Japan, in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at 97 (discussing
role of apology in reducing Japan's crime rate since World War II).
25. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737 (citing Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans,
Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 31, 47-50 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
26. See, e.g., Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial
Violence, 25 J. OF L. & SOC'Y 237,241 & n. 18 (1998).
27. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETrIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:
A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997).
28. See, e.g., Bazemore, Civic Repentance, in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at viii
("My main thesis is that we should adopt the religious concept of repentance into our civic
culture."); id. at vii ("the lack of opportunities for full restoration [for offenders] exacts
social costs.").
29. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1743.
30. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1743-44.
31. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1744. Braithwaite asserts that "[v]ictims often
wanted an apology more than compensation. Forgiveness from their families was often
more important to the restoration of offenders than anything else." Id.
32. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1744. Braithwaite and Philip Pettit describe
"alternative model accountability conferences" as appropriate whenever criminal
defendants "decline to deny" their guilt. Braithwaite & Pettit, supra note 15, at 771.
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reservations about restorative justice models. They charge that the
informality of typical restorative justice programs can eliminate
crucial rights,33 reinforce pre-existing subordinating relationships,'
insidiously enlarge the reach of the state,3" dangerously reduce the
protection of the state,36 reproduce inequality of results,37 and obscure
systemic contexts and causes for the offense.38 Rather than healing
the victim as promised, restorative justice processes can pressure
victims to forgive their attackers too easily,3 9 causing further
victimization, including violence.4" These concerns are grounds for
33. See, e.g., Jenny Bargen, Kids, Cops, Courts, Conferencing and Children's Rights -
A Note of Perspectives, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. OF HUM. RIGHTS 209 (1996); Brown, supra note
7, at 1287-91 (discussing absence of such protections as right of confidentiality and right to
counsel); J. Stubbs, 'Communitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A
Cautionary Note, in WIFE ASSAULT AND THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
260 (Mariana Valverde, L. MacLeod & K. Johnson, eds., 1995); Daniel W. Van Ness,
Legal Issues of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE
HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 263 (G. Bazemore & L. Walgrave eds., 1999); K. Warner, The
Rights of the Offender in Family Conferences, in FAMILY CONFERENCING AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE: THE WAY FORWARD OR MISPLACED OPTIMISM? (C. Alder & J. Wundersitz
eds., 1994).
34. See, e.g., Stephen Hooper & Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and the Restorative
Justice Initiatives: The Risks of a New Panacea, 4 WAIKATO L. REV. 101 (1996).
35. See, e.g., George Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and
Formation of Self-Identity, 30 L. & SOC'Y REv. 707,711 (1996) ("explor[ing] mediation as
a governmentalization (cf. expansion) of state dispute resolution" and noting that critics
of community mediation charge that it "actually expand(s) and intensif(ies) state control"
in a particularly "insidious" way because "on the surface, [it] appears to be a process of
retraction") (citing Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing
Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL 1:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 262 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982)).
36. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7; Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi"
Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000).
37. See, e.g., Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence against Women:
Issues of Gender and Race, 20 INTER'L. J. OF COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 233, 236
(1996) (arguing that community-based justice programs need to be assessed in terms of
inclusion of women, safety and protection of women, and power and control).
38. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 38-73; Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the
Role of Community, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 85, 89; see also
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Social Justice, 63 SASK. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000)
(noting that "[o]nce colonialism, slavery, and immigration has ruptured the lives of
Indigenous peoples, all forms of justice, including the most plural forms of restorative
justice, serve as a threat to social justice for First Nations .... ").
39. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 85-88 (describing what she calls the "cheap-
justice problem"); see generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT
AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 51(1999) (noting emptiness of
race apologies which rest on "inadequate acknowledgements or have no material effect on
the participants' relationship" ).
40. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 80-82 (describing women injured immediately
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caution, but not rejection, of restorative justice approaches. Surely
most of the same objections are valid challenges to current criminal
and juvenile justice systems; the anti-gang public nuisance injunctions
are reminders of the vast difference between the theoretical rights of
our current system and the reality of implementation.
Further, restorative justice offers potentially significant
responses to several important critiques of current criminal justice
practices." Three particular points support a hopeful exploration of
restorative justice. First, restorative justice might offer a practical
program to dislodge some harmful but deeply entrenched socially
constructed identities of criminals and communities. Policies about
crime and punishment are influenced by powerful but ambiguous
ideas about community and individual responsibility, both of which
are deeply class-based and racialized. Socially constructed knowledge
about the individual who is the criminal and the community that
deserves protection are bounded by largely unspoken class, gender,
and race identities." For example, the anti-gang injunctions target
Latino and African-American young people, subjecting them to guilt
based on group association and identifying them as distinct and
separate from the deserving community. In this, the anti-gang public
nuisance injunctions ratify and reinforce class- and race-based
constructions of crime and community.
Meaningful restorative justice offers at least the possibility of
cracking through entrenched racialized barriers to justice.
Restorative justice programs use case-by-case identification and
involvement of and engagement by the truly relevant communities,
the people closest to the victim and to the offender. In this way
restorative justice programs disperse power to outsider communities,
after Peacemaking).
41. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice As Environmental Justice, 1 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 , 28 (1997) (suggesting a transformative environmental justice
approach to criminal justice in part because the civil rights approach, with its principled
focus on individual defendants, "does not address the very real toll that crime takes on
neighborhoods and families").
42. See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUSTICE 97, 102-14 (1997) (discussing widespread associations of Black men with
criminal behavior); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997)
(criticizing generalized suspicions linking men of color to crime); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL,
THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAxES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM,
POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS (1998) (criticizing widespread
associations of blacks with lawbreaking).
43. See, e.g. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA (1995).
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and acknowledge and build upon the complex identities of specific
individuals and communities. These aspects of restorative justice
directly challenge the racialized and class-based social constructions
of crime and criminals that inform so much of current criminal and
juvenile justice law and policy.
Second, restorative justice offers the possibility of feminist re-
visioning of crime and punishment.' Specifically, restorative justice
principles are consistent with the insights of relational feminism,
because they build on the goal of reinforcing positive connections
between individuals and communities rather than reinforcing the
isolated individualism of traditional liberal legal thought.5 Certainly
feminist interventions in criminal justice have not always relied on
restorative justice principles, 46 and, feminists are among those raising
cautions about potential dangers of restorative justice." In spite of
those warnings, I join those feminists intrigued by the possibilities of
restorative justice.'
Third, today's criminal justice system is so far removed from
44. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Criminal Law and Justice System Practices as Racis
White, and Racialized, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 431, 433 (1994) ("If crime and justice
system policies in the United States are to move from a largely penalizing, criminalizing,
and warehousing model to a more humane system that envisions welfare, restoration, and
reintegration as its principles, then we must radically reconfigure conceptions of manhood
and masculinity").
45. E.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 34 (noting the "relational justice" foundation of
Navajo Peacemaking); Braithwaite & Pettit, Republican Criminology, supra note 32, at
771 (suggesting consistency between ethic of care and restorative justice conferencing); see
also Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1517
(2000) (assuming that the wrong of harm is "the breaking of trust with one's community
and the injury to the victim as a community member"); id. at 1520 (noting that "the basic
public trust is necessary for simply leaving the house in the morning").
46. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Pettit, Republican Criminology, supra note 15, at 770 n. 1
(commenting that the "women's movement is becoming a less retributive, less stigmatizing
social movement"); Kathleen Daly, Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist
Redress, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 777 (1994) (reminding of multiplicity of feminisms).
47. See, e.g., Stubbs, supra note 33, at 260.
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different
Voices: Some Feminist Questions about Justice, 17 INT'LJ. SOCIOLOGY L. 1 (1989); Angela
P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 803-04
(2000); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent
Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 981(1998). The connections between restorative
justice and republican principles (see BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 27) and
Habermas' theories of democracy and discourse (see JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996); cf Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic
Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33 (1996)) are also intriguing.
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goals of justice and safety that fundamental change is required.
Restorative justice offers such a deep rethinking. The court in Acuna
was willing to jettison cherished individual rights to uphold creative
responses to aid a community overtaken by crime. Perhaps the same
openness to creativity can be brought to restorative justice principles
and programs. Its central role for the victim, combined with concern
for the offender, brings restorative justice support from all sides of
the political spectrum, which might mean that restorative justice is
both transformative and feasible.49
II. Anti-gang Injunctions
Although anti-gang public nuisance injunctions cry out for
criticism on standard civil liberties grounds" and as a racialized anti-
crime strategy,"1 my critique here is based on the principles of
restorative justice. Inspection of the anti-gang injunctions using
restorative justice principles underscores the fundamental differences
between restorative justice methodologies and principles, and
traditional individual rights-based civil liberties and constitutional
49. See Braithwaite, Utopian, supra note 13, at 1745-46 (suggesting that the
effectiveness and increased satisfaction from restorative justice conferencing offer the
promise of a truly feasible transformation, even in conservative, punitive cultures); Francis
T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher, & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion about Punishment
and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 47 (2000) ("there is beginning to be evidence that
restorative justice is favored by the public"); id., at 45 ("[R]esearch shows that sanctions
with a restorative quality are strongly embraced by citizens").
50. See, e.g., Boga, supra note 5, at 494-502 (arguing that anti-gang injunctions violate
First Amendment rights of association and free assembly); McClellan, supra note 5, at 373-
78 (arguing that anti-gang injunctions must be limited to individuals actively participating
or with specific intent to participate in unlawful gang activities); Werdegar, supra note 5
(arguing that injunctions are unconstitutional on vagueness, guilt by association, and
procedural due process grounds in addition to being of limited usefulness); Yaeger, supra
note 5, at 641 (suggesting that anti-gang injunctions should be geographically limited) &
648-651 (suggesting that anti-gang injunctions must be limited to individuals who have
committed acts deemed to be public nuisances). But see Gregory S. Walston, Taking the
Constitution at its Word: A Defense of the Use of Anti-gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 47 (1999) (defense of constitutionality of anti-gang injunctions by California Deputy
Attorney General).
51. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:
A "Magic Mirror' into the Heart of Darkness," 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1138 (1998) (identifying
anti-gang injunction as "battlefield for Anglos and Mexican Americans to fight for status
in the U.S. social hierarchy"); Gary Stewart, Note: Black Codes and Broken Windows: The
Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE LJ. 2249 (1998); cf
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999) (charging anti-gang
loitering ordinances reinforce the social meaning of communities of color as law-
breakers).
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claims.
Attorneys in the office of Los Angeles City Attorney James
Hahn invented the anti-gang public nuisance injunction, and filed the
first such action, People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, in Los Angeles
Superior Court in 1987.52 The injunction sought against the Playboy
Gangster Crips was not only the first, but perhaps also the most
expansive anti-gang public nuisance action attempted. The named
defendants against whom the injunction was sought were "Playboy
Gangster Crips, an unincorporated association" and "DOES 1
through 300, inclusive."53  The injunction was sought against "the
defendant unincorporated association and all of its members, agents,
servants, employees, and representatives, and all persons acting in
concert with them."'  The order prosecutors wanted would have
applied to several square miles near La Cienega Boulevard in Los
Angeles, and would have prevented any two of those unidentified
three hundred people from being in public together in that area,
including in public hallways.5 Any of the three hundred defendants
who were minors were to be ordered not to "loiter" anywhere in
public between sunset and sunrise unless accompanied by a parent,
guardian, or a spouse over the age of twenty-one.56 No matter what
their age, defendants would violate the proposed order by being in
public anywhere in the area of the injunction for more than five
52. See People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 26, 1987); Aaron Curtiss, West Side gang members claim crackdown violates their
rights, L.A. HERALD EXAM., Nov. 15, 1987, at Al; Paul Feldman, City Attorney to Ask
Tight Restrictions on Crips Gang, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1987, Pt. 2, at 1; James Hahn, New
methods needed to defeat gangs, L.A. HERALD ExAM., Nov. 23, 1987. As a Staff
Attorney for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, I represented the ACLU in
its legal and public opposition to the injunctions. See, e.g., Paul Feldman, Court Rejects
City Attorney's Bid to Curb Westside Gang's Movements, L.A. TMES, Nov. 6, 1987, Pt. 2,
at 1.
53. Complaint, People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County
Super. Ct. filed Oct. 26, 1987).
54. Preliminary Injunction (Proposed), People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC
118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct.).
55. The proposed injunction included the following order: "a. Do not congregate in
groups of two or more upon any public street, avenue, alley, park, public place or place
open to public view or in any public hallway or public passageway at any time of the day
or night." Id. at 2.
56. Id. ("b. If you are a person of under the age of 18 years, do not loiter about any
public street, avenue, alley, park or other public place between the time of sunset and the
time of sunrise of the following day, unless accompanied by your parent or legal guardian




minutes,57 attending a party with other gang members that was
audible outside the apartment or residence where the party was being
held,58 or failing to carry government-issued identification at all
times.s9
In addition to seeking prohibitions against a number of specific
law violations' and a general prohibition against any lawbreaking,6'
the prosecutors also included within the proposed order a provision
preventing any of the three hundred Doe defendants from refusing
consent to any personal or vehicle search or seizure.62  The
prosecutors sought to prohibit a variety of nuisance activities, from
littering' to blocking ingress and egress.6' The order sought also
would have prevented grafitti by prohibiting the possession of
markers and paint,' and prevented drug trafficking by prohibiting the
57. Id. ("c. Do not remain upon any public street, avenue, alley, park or other public
place or in any place open to public view or in any public hallway or public passage way
for more than five minutes at any time of the day or night.").
58. Id. ("d. Do not be present at, or participate in, any party where other gang
members are present and which is audible beyond the confines of the apartment or
residence where the party is located.").
59. Id. ("v. Do not fail to carry valid photo identification issued by the California
Department of Motor Vehicles or any other governmental agency.").
60. E.g., id., at 2 ("e. Do not enter or be present upon the private property of another
without permission"); at 3 ("h. Do not fire or discharge, or cause to be fired or discharged,
any pellet gun, starter pistol or firearm of any type at any time of the day or night"); at 4
("k. Do not damage or deface, or cause others to damage or deface, by spray painting or
otherwise, public property or private property not owned by you"; "n. Do not use or
possess or consume an alcoholic beverage on any public street, avenue, alley, park, public
place or place open to public view or in any public hallway or public passageway at any
time of the day or night"); "r. Do not urinate or defecate upon any public street, avenue,
alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in any public
hallway or public passageway.").
61. Id& ("w. Do not violate any law.").
62. Id. ("x. As a showing of good faith compliance with the provisions of this order,
do not refuse to consent to any search of your person or vehicle or to seizure of any
contraband as defined by this order when requested by any peace officer or probation
officer.").
63. Id. at 5 ("s. Do not litter, or cause other persons to litter, upon any public street,
avenue, alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in any
public hallway or public passageway.").
64. Id ("q. Do not block the free egress or ingress to or from any street, driveway,
sidewalk, house, building, vehicle or other place.").
65. Id. at 4 (". Do not possess on your person or in a vehicle upon any public street,
avenue, alley, park, public place or place open to public view or in any public hallway or
public passageway at any time of the day or night any paint or any marker with an
application surface greater than one quarter (1/4) inch.").
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possession of drugs' or communications equipment,' the approaching
of cars,' or any welcoming of short-term visitors.69 Thus the
prosecutor's idea was to use the civil law of public nuisance
abatements to effectively criminalize the low-level, annoying
behaviors of gang members.' In this, the public nuisance anti-gang
injunction is consistent with other "broken windows"'" or public order
policing and prosecutorial initiatives, including Chicago's broad anti-
loitering ordinance struck down by the Supreme Court in City of
Chicago v. Morales.72
The civil liberties problems with the anti-gang public nuisance
injunctions are obvious. Without waiting to be asked, and, indeed,
without ever meeting any of the Playboy Gangster Crips, the ACLU
intervened on their behalf. The ACLU sought to limit the reach of
the injunction to individuals specifically named as defendants and
shown to have been served, sought to limit the activities prohibited
under the injunction to activity that was already unlawful, and argued
that any defendant in the proceedings on the granting of injunctive
relief had a right to counsel, including the appointment of counsel
upon a showing of indigency.73 The trial court agreed with each of the
66. Id. ("m. Do not use or possess or provide to any other person any narcotic or
controlled substance or related paraphernalia or poison.").
67. Id. at 3-4 ("j. Do not possess on your person or in a vehicle upon any public
street, avenue, alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in
any public hallway or public passageway any remote communication device including, but
not limited to, any walkie-talkie, paging device, or portable, remote or car telephone.").
68. Id. at 3 ("f. Do not approach the driver or passenger of any vehicle.").
69. Id. at 5 ("u. Do not have more than one (1) visitor at your residence within a
twenty-four (24) hour period who remains less than ten (10) minutes, except public
employees, utility service personnel or delivery persons from lawful businesses.").
70. Commentary on People v. Playboy Gangster Crips includes Boga, supra note 5, at
478-79; Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 739, 744 & n. 19; Debra R. Schultz, Comment "The Right to be Let Alone":
Fourth Amendment Rights and Gang Violence, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 725, 733-34 (1989);
Stewart; supra note 51, at 2264; Woo, supra note 3, at 217-219; Mark Thompson, A
Gangland Nuisance, CAL. LAW. (Jan-Feb. 1988) at 21.
71. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, (Mar. 1982) at 29 (advancing highly influential claim that eliminating relatively
minor signs of neighborhood disorder deters more serious crime); see, e.g., Kurki, supra
note 10, at 238 (describing influence of Wilson and Kelling's "broken windows" theory).
72. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
73. See People v.Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct.).
Subsequently an appellate court has ruled that appointment of counsel is not required in
these injunction proceedings. See Iraheta v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70
Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999). In Iraheta prosecutors filed a civil lawsuit seeking an injunction
to abate a public nuisance naming the 18 Street Gang, 92 individuals, and 200 "Doe"
TOWARD RESTORATIVE CONSTITUTION
ACLU arguments, and issued an injunction limited in those ways. In
these circumstances, both the ACLU and the City Attorney's office
claimed victory, and the anti-gang public nuisance injunction was
virtually dead for the next five years.'
In 1992, a spate of California cities attempted to revive and
expand the anti-gang public nuisance injunction, and found greater
judicial receptiveness. 5 Probably the most expansive was the twenty-
two point preliminary injunction issued in People v. Blythe Street
Gang, which named a 350-person gang as defendant and covered an
180-block area. 6 The most important of these injunctions, however,
was sought by prosecutors in San Jose and eventually upheld by the
California Supreme Court in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna?
From Playboy Gangster Crips to Acuna, the pattern for these
cases was the same: prosecutors prepared a case for a preliminary
injunction based on scores of declarations from police officers and
residents who reported the criminal activity of gang members
terrorizing the people of the neighborhood. In Acuna, the California
Supreme Court relied on forty-eight declarations to find that San
defendants (id. at 1502), and alleging that the defendants "waged a gang war, including
engaging in drug dealing, shootings, robberies, drinking and urinating in public,
threatening residents, vandalizing and defacing with graffiti public and private property,
trespassing on property, and other injurious activities against the residents." Id. at 1502-
03. The court found no right to counsel, holding that "the purpose of these proceedings is
not to punish petitioners. Rather, the purpose of these proceedings is to protect the rights
of people residing and working in the target areas .... ." Id. at 1512.
74. See Paul Feldman, Judge OK's Modified Measures to Curb Gang, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; Paul Feldman, Judge Raps City Atty.'s Bid to Neutralize Gangs,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; Paul Feldman, City Attorney Modifies Plan to
Control Street Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; see also Woo, supra note 3, at
219 (noting the five year gap before next anti-gang injunction, but assessing it as a surprise
in light of the "success" of the Playboy Gangster Crips injunction). In spite of the very
limited nature of the uncontested injunction, the City claimed that the injunction changed
the neighborhood dramatically. See, e.g., Westside Gang Crime Off, L.A. TIMES, June 2,
1988, at 2, 3 (home ed.) (reporting 30% reduction in gang-related crime after Playboy
Gangster Crips injunction). The effectiveness of these injunctions as crime reduction tools
is in dispute, however. Many prosecutors claim that each has been a tremendous success,
but some evidence suggests otherwise. See ACLU FOUNDATION OF SO. CAL., FALSE
PREMISE, FALSE PROMISE: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS
AFTERMATH (1997) (providing data supporting claim that the Panorama City anti-gang
injunction simply moved the criminal activity, without reducing it).
75. For fuller descriptions of the anti-gang injunctions, see Boga, supra note 5, at text
accompanying notes 1-31; Stewart supra note 51, at 2264-68; Werdegar, supra note 5, at
415-418; Woo, supra note 3, at 219-221.
76. N. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Apr. 27, 1993) (modified
order for preliminary injunctions), described in Werdegar, supra note 5, at 415 & n. 34.
77. 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100 (1997).
Summer 20001
732 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:717
Jose's Rocksprings neighborhood was "an urban war zone."78 The
Acuna trial court had issued a twenty-four paragraph injunction
against thirty-eight defendants,79 prohibiting a wide range of activity
within the four-block Rocksprings neighborhood -- including fighting,
trespassing, public urinating, littering, and public possession of
hammers, nails, screw drivers, pagers or beepers.' Upon
interlocutory appeal, the court of appeal, invalidated fifteen of the
twenty-four provisions as being unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad, leaving only provisions that enjoined conduct defined as
crimes under the California Penal Code,8 essentially repeating the
guarded and critical Playboy Gangster Crips judicial response. The
City sought California Supreme Court review of only two of the
contested provisions, the one that prevented any of the named
defendants from being in public with any other defendant or member
of the targeted gang, and the one that enjoined defendants from
"confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening,
challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or
patrons, or visitors to [the neighborhood] known to have complained
about gang activities. "' The California Supreme Court's enthusiasm
for the public nuisance injunction suggests that the City could have
been much more ambitious in the provisions it took to the Court.
The majority endorsed the injunction, rejecting First Amendment
arguments based on freedom of association,84 overbreadth,' and
vagueness86 claims.
Notwithstanding the Acuna majority opinion, and the spread to
other states of anti-gang public nuisance injunctions,. the individual
78. Id. at 1101.
79. Id.
80. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4 at 1135 n. 3 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1101.
82. Id. Paragraph (a) enjoined defendants from "Standing, sitting, walking, driving,
gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant.., or with any
other known 'VST' (Varrio Sureno Town or Varrio Sureno Treces) or 'VSL' (Varrio
Sureno Locos) member." Id
83. Id. at 1118.
84. Id. at 1111.
85. Id. at 1114.
86. Id. at 1118-19.
87. See Chris Fiscus, Phoenix Aims to Break Gangs' Grip: Calif Shows Way to Bar
Menacing Street Gatherings, ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 23, 1998, at Al; John W. Gonzalez,
Judge Limits Suspects with 'Gang Injunction,' HOUSTON CHRON. ,Aug. 1, 1998, at 1. The
Los Angeles City Attorney's office claims to have received inquiries about the anti-gang
injunctions from prosecuting agencies in Illinois, Texas, Arkansas, Florida, and Arizona.
rights flaws in the concept are obvious. The central principle of being
held responsible for one's own acts, the centerpiece of our
constitutional system of criminal procedure, is noticeably absent.'
The injunction is justified on the basis of many serious crimes
allegedly committed by members of the gangs; those serious crimes
are used to inhibit the freedom of all the alleged members of the
gang, without any evidence tying the individual controlled by the
injunction to the specific criminal activity justifying the injunction. In
Acuna, for example, the court found that "murder, attempted
murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson and
theft are commonplace,""' but the injunction reaches people who are
suspected gang members, whether or not they have any record of
arrest or conviction, 90 and whether they are suspected of committing
the acts that constitute a public nuisance. As noted by the dissenting
justices, the injunctions rest on extremely expansive notions of guilt
by association.9 A person can be identified as a gang member simply
by having been observed twice in the presence of other identified
gang members; Justice Mosk noted that Los Angeles law enforcement
officials have identified 47 percent of the African American men
between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four as suspected gang
members, using similar criteria.'
The injunctions also take advantage of the lower burden of proof
in a civil action and the lack of criminal procedural protections for the
defendant. A civil defendant has no right to appointed counsel, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. By its terms, the
injunction implicates fundamental rights of association and
expression, and suggests vagueness and overbreadth problems as
well.93
But restorative justice, not those glaring individual liberties
issues, is my concern here. The anti-gang injunctions offer surface
consistency with the principles of restorative justice, but
McClellan, supra note 5, at 359.
88. See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4' 1090, 1145-47 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
89. 14 Cal. 4 at 1100.
90. See 14 Cal. 4th at 1146 n. 11 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
91. See id at 1129-32 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 1142-47 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
92. See id. at 1133 n. 1 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
93. See also In re Englebrecht, 67 Cal. App. 4th 486 (1998) (upholding association
limitations of anti-gang injunction on basis of Acuna but striking down as overbroad
provision that prohibited gang members from using pagers or beepers within two-square
mile area).
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fundamentally operate in a way that undermines the values and
promise of restorative justice. That betrayal may be even more
damning than the substantial civil liberties defects in the public
nuisance injunctions.
III. Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-gang Injunctions
The anti-gang injunctions appear similar to restorative justice
programs in the explicit involvement of the community, the active
role of the victims, the understanding of a crime as an injury, and the
underlying willingness to circumvent established criminal justice
process.
A. Presence of the community
A restorative justice perspective assumes that crime causes injury
to the community. Restorative justice programs rely on collective,
community responsibility for responses to lawbreaking in part to
repair the breach to the community that perhaps preceded and
certainly was worsened by the crime. The "community" is as present
in the Acuna Court's justification for the arguable civil liberties
infringements of the anti-gang injunctions as it is in the aspirations of
restorative justice. In Acuna, the California Supreme Court
reminded us, "[i]t is precisely this recognition of-and willingness to
vindicate-the value of community and the collective interests it
furthers rather than to punish criminal acts that lies at the heart of the
public nuisance as an equitable doctrine."' The court recognized the
collective participation in the public nuisance injunction: "[t]he public
nuisance doctrine is aimed at the protection and redress of
community interests and, at least in theory, embodies a kind of
collective ideal of civil life which the courts have vindicated by
equitable remedies since the beginning of the 16th century."95
Successfully giving voice to community concerns would be a
significant strength of an anti-gang injunction. The complaint in
Acuna attached forty-eight declarations about the criminal activity in
the Rocksprings neighborhood of San Jose.96 The Acuna court
affirmed that "the interests of the community are not invariably less
94. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4!h at 1109.
95. Id. at 1103; see also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1160-61 (1998) (referring to anti-gang
injunctions as examples of "community policing").
96. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1100.
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important than the freedom of individuals."'  At this level of
generality, such sentiments are hard to dispute." The Acuna court,
however, promoted a notion of community safety and individual
liberties as directly in conflict, as warring combatants in a winner-
take-all contest 9 The Acuna court found the freedom of alleged
gang members to be directly contrary to the freedom of innocent
members of the community, observing: "[t]o hold that the liberty of
the peaceful, industrious residents of Rocksprings must be forfeited
to preserve the illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is
deleterious to the community as a whole is to ignore half the political
promise of the Constitutional and the whole of its sense.""' This view
of the community and gang members as easily separated and in
complete opposition is a dangerously over-simplified understanding
of gang presence; it is inconsistent with the reality of most gang
members, who have multiple family and institutional ties to the
communities of their own and nearby neighborhoods. The complex
relationships of gang members within their communities is one reason
that law enforcement against gang crimes is so difficult.
The Acuna court upheld an injunction that had the purpose of
banishing the gang members from the streets of the neighborhood,
literally removing them from the community.' Indeed, the only
clearly delineated aspect of the community invoked in Acuna is that it
does not include the gang members. The injunction made real in
physical, spacial terms the separation of the gang members from the
community. The Acuna court's simplistic and adamant separation of
suspected gang members from the community is especially troubling
given the racial and class basis of the identity of the group being cast
97. Id. at 1102.
98. Indeed, similar statements are used to justify restorative justice programs in the
face of civil liberties objections.
99. But see, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 63
(2000). Braithwaite challenges this offset: "The republican does not struggle politically for
a world in which shaming is used in a way that trades a reduction in freedom for a
reduction in crime. Such a trade-off manifests a liberal way of thinking about crime. The
republican struggles for a world where shame is used both to increase freedom and to
reduce crime. The widespread liberal belief that a high crime rate is a price we pay for
free society, that freedom and crime are locked into some hydraulic relationship, is
wrong." Id.
100. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1125.
101. See Boga, supra note 5, at text accompanying notes 60-61 ("The removal of gang
members from their own neighborhood streets represents a literal example of this
metaphorical sanitization of the public realm.").
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out, suspected gang members.1°2
Restorative justice principles, by contrast, build the relationship
between the community and the offender, rather than casting the
offender aside. The community is present by the involvement of
people close to the victim, and of people close to the offender. This is
a much more complex notion of community, for several reasons.
First, in direct contrast to the exclusionary vision of community in
Acuna, restorative justice principles recognize the offender's place
within a community, and attempt to restore that place." Next, the
restorative justice conferences create new, concrete, albeit temporary
communities, by bringing together interested people to address the
problems caused by the wrong-doing. Finally, the restorative process
can create relationships between the offender and the victim, and
between their respective supporters, and in that way build new, more
lasting communities. The creation of these purposeful communities
might be especially important in the context of broken or enfeebled
communities, such as those plagued by rampant gang violence.1"4
B. Victim Control
In the restorative justice model, the victim of crime and members
of the community are actively engaged in the process of restoring
justice. Even within their limited constructions of community, the
anti-gang injunctions promise to deliver greater victim control than
criminal processes can. The use of a civil action based on declarations
of specific injuries from many community members is quite a
different foundation and justification for action than the typical
criminal complaint. Recognizing the crime as an injury and giving
voice to the victim might be the rhetoric and formality of the public
nuisance injunction, but the reality is quite different. Although voices
of the victims and the community are used to justify the injunction,
102. See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1130 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[The] court
cannot enjoin all Mexican-Americans because some Mexican-Americans contribute to the
public nuisance in Rocksprings."); id. at 1132 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Montesquieu,
Locke, and Madison will turn over in their graves when they learn they are cited in an
opinion that does not enhance liberty but deprives a number of simple rights to a group of
Latino youths who have not been convicted of a crime.").
103. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, supra note 99, at 287 ("The separation of the
denounced person must be terminated by rituals of inclusion that place him, even
physically, inside rather than outside").
104. See, e.g., BRAITHWArE, REGULATION, supra note 99, at 332 ("In the alienated
urban context where community is not spontaneously emergent in a satisfactory way, a
criminal justice system aimed at restoration can construct a community of care around a
specific offender or a specific victim who is in trouble....").
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they are not in any sense controlling the action. For example, of the
scores of declarations supporting the injunction in Acuna, the only
ones that linked the crime alleged to the targeted gangs were two
declarations from police officers. °5 The anti-gang public nuisance
injunctions are formally civil, but effectively criminal proceedings;
prosecutors, and not victims, initiate and ultimately control the case.
The injunction can give the prosecutor the ability to pursue rough
justice," but those remedial choices are not in the hands of the
victims, or the community.
C. Crime as Injury
Restorative justice responds to the crime as an injury to be
healed. The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions treat crimes as
injuries to be remedied; the nuisance to the community is the injury
created by the gang members' lawbreaking. Anti-gang injunctions
are thus formally based on recognizing the injury--the public
nuisance--caused by the criminal activity. But the anti-gang
injunctions operate by converting that injury to the community into
another crime, namely the violation of the injunction. The remedy
for the public nuisance is that individual gang members can be
arrested for violating the terms of the injunction, subjecting them to
misdemeanor criminal contempt.
The original serious criminal offenses (murder, robbery, and so
on) are converted into an injury (public nuisance), which is used to
justify restrictions on activity that, when violated, create new, lesser
level crimes. The result is that the gang members suspected of
participating in murders, robberies, and other serious crimes are
arrested for being in the presence of other gang members, having
beepers, and other non-criminal activity.
These new, low-level violations are understood and treated as
crimes, not injuries. In fact, any injuries inherent in the violations are
105. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th at 1131 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). But see Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 669-70 (1997) (in analysis
supporting relaxation of vagueness requirements generally, praising injunctions as
consistent with new policing in their requirement of police interaction with community
members to obtain affidavits).
106. See McClellan, supra note 5, at 355 (describing Los Angeles assistant city attorney
who seeks "creative" punishments, such as community service, completion of drug or
alcohol rehabilitation, or requiring the achievement of a general equivalency diploma, for
injunction defendants who have not previously been incarcerated).
107. See CAL. PEN. CODE, § 166 (Deering 2000).
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often so attenuated as to be virtually non-existent. What is the injury
from having two gang members together in a car, or walking down
the street? Who is the victim? Who is the victim from the defendant's
possession of a beeper? The anti-gang public nuisance injunction
creates more violations without addressing the original, serious
crimes. The police presence is extended, and the government has
further mechanisms of control, at least in theory. But the criminal
problem has been treated as an injury in only the most formal and
temporary sense. The fundamental restorative project of repairing
injuries has been easily lost.
D. Holding the Offender Accountable
The central theme of restorative justice is healing injury by
holding the offender accountable to make amends for the injuries he
or she has caused. In theory, the anti-gang public nuisance
injunctions hold gang members responsible for the injuries caused to
the community by the gang's activities. The Acuna court justified the
breadth of the injunction by noting, "Freedom and responsibility are
joined at the hip. ' 8
But the rhetoric of accountability masks the opposite in the anti-
gang injunctions. From a restorative justice perspective, the problem
with the anti-gang injunction is not that gang members are being held
responsible for being members of a gang identified with destructive
behaviors. Gang members should be held accountable for those
choices and actions. The accountability problem with the anti-gang
injunction is much deeper; the gang members are not really held
responsible for anything significant. The litany of murders, robberies,
and assaults combining to place the neighborhood under siege is used
to justify dramatic steps to limit the freedom of the gang members.
But the only accountability built into the injunction is making
suspected gang members responsible for trivial (at least as compared
to the justificatory crimes) violations.
The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions are promoted as an
aggressive new weapon in the war against gangs, but fundamentally
they are an admission of defeat."+ From a restorative justice
perspective, a crucial weakness in this scheme is that the entire
process never holds anyone accountable for the serious crimes that in
fact are causing injuries. The gang member who has (at least in
108. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4h at 1102.
109. This is the anti-gang equivalent of convicting Al Capone on income tax evasion,
except that income tax evasion was a preexisting, serious crime.
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theory) participated in murder is arrested for being present with other
gang members. No one is held accountable for the earlier, provoking
crimes.' Gang members who are indeed responsible for serious
crimes are not held accountable for them. Suspected gang members
who are not responsible for serious crimes are blamed equally for
them, and arrested for behavior that can be entirely innocent. In
either case, the goals of true accountability or individual
responsibility are sacrificed to temporary incapacitation or disruption
through removal into the incarceration system.
The injunction is a symbolic message of removal from the
community. As a method of accountability, it is ineffective because
the sanctions are more like harassment. The provisions of the
injunction upheld in Acuna prohibited suspected gang members from
hanging out with their friends... or "annoying" people in the
neighborhood known to have complained about them."' Declaring
certain people out of the community, and then removing them for a
short time for violating an injunction, combines the harshness of
punitive expulsion from the community with virtually no
accountability.
The relatively trivial nature of the basis for the arrest is not likely
to imbue the alleged gang member, whether a serious offender or
relatively innocent peripheral member, with acknowledgement of any
injury caused."' In contrast, by being held personally responsible for
redressing the injuries he or she has caused, an offender in a
restorative justice process is less likely to "displace remorse for the
110. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 21, at 12 (asking, as part of the project of
"rethinking the business of juvenile justice": "If the goal of sanctioning is to send messages
to offenders about the consequences and harm caused to others by crime, why are
sanctions so unrelated to the offense itself and why is the sanctioning and rehabilitative
process so detached from victims and the offender's community?" (drawing on Bazemore
and Washington, Charting the Future of the Juvenile Justice System: Reinventing Mission
and Management, 68 SPECrRUM, THE JOURNAL OF STATE GOVERNMENT 51 (1995))).
111. See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4 at 1110 (par. (a) of injunction prohibited "Standing, sitting,
walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other
defendant... or with any other known VST or VSL member.").
112. Id. at 1118 (par. (k) of injunction enjoined defendants from "confronting,
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or
battering any residents or patrons or visitors to Rocksprings... known to have
complained about gang activities.").
113. Gary Stewart makes this point about the anti-gang injunctions by quoting
Malcolm W. Klein, Street Gangs and the Juvenile Justice System in the 1990s, 23 PEPP. L.
REV. 860, 863 (1996), asking, "[d]oes he say, 'Oh my goodness gracious. I have been
deterred,' or does he say, if you will pardon the language, 'Motherfuckers couldn't hold
the homey.' Of course, he says the latter." Stewart, supra note 51, at 2278.
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action into resentment of the punishment."'' 4 In addition, the goal of
healing the injury to the community goes largely unmet if the original
offense is unaddressed.
E. Circumvention of Criminal Justice Protections
Critics of restorative justice are appropriately wary about the
potential loss of criminal procedural protections, but Acuna reveals
that fundamental procedural protections are already drastically
diminished, at least for some. In Acuna the majority of the California
Supreme Court willingly jettisoned fundamental individual rights in
the furtherance of arguably minimal benefits to the community. Such
an emphatic and untroubled balancing suggests that the Acuna
majority placed remarkably little value on the freedoms at stake."1
The stunningly light weight given to the civil liberties issues is surely
related to the particular context of Acuna and other anti-gang public
nuisance injunctions, young men and some women of color suspected
of gang membership. Acuna might suggest that the racialized and
class-based divisions of our society are so imbedded in the individual
rights-based, adversarial criminal justice system that the "individual"
being protected is too easily understood to be both "other" and
undifferentiated, and thus not truly worthy of constitutional
protection. Individual rights are easily stripped from suspects
perceived mainly on the basis of a frightening group identity." In
Acuna, the community got little in return. Most restorative justice
programs also replace or circumvent ordinary criminal justice
procedures. The question is, what replaces those protections, and
what is gained?
IV. Restorative Justice for Rocksprings
What would restorative justice for Rocksprings look like? The
114. Hudson, supra note 26, at 241.
115. See also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the anti-loitering ordinance should have been upheld, since the "minor
limitation upon the free state of nature that this prophylactic arrangement imposed upon
all Chicagoans seemed to them (and it seems to me) a small price to pay for liberation of
their streets"). But see Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219 (2000) (finding that the empirical data does not suggest poor urban blacks are
prepared to waive constitutional rights in order to reduce crime).
116. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 42 (discussing, for example, the incompatibility of
imposed identity of Black gang member and innocence); Roberts, supra note 51, at 801
(criticizing a racialized dichotomy in judicial decisions separating categories of the law
abiding and lawless).
[Vol. 27:717
picture of Rocksprings painted in Acuna is a neighborhood under
siege from gang members engaged in violent, lawless, battles with
other gangs and with the police. The gang members arguably control
the neighborhood more than do the police. The anti-gang injunction
strategy attempts to eviscerate the gang control by holding all gang
members responsible for all injuries caused by the gang. Easily
identifiable activity, such as possession of beepers or association with
other gang members, becomes the basis for an arrest. The reach of
the police is thereby extended to peripheral gang members, and to
less serious activity. The hardcore gangsters and the peripheral
hangers-on are all controlled by the limiting injunction.
What does the gentle theorizing of restorative justice have to say
about restoring peace to an "urban war zone"'17 like Rocksprings?
Restorative justice would use a variety of mechanisms to empower
community engagement with the identification, prevention, and
response to criminal injuries. As to crimes that have been committed,
the goal of accountability assumes, as a threshold matter, that even
the most limited restorative justice process would be based on
identification of the specific individuals responsible for any particular
injury. Although claims are made that restorative justice can be useful
for identifying crime and assigning guilt,"' more modest claims limit
restorative justice mechanisms to offenders who have been found
guilty or who are willing to admit responsibility."9 Assuming that the
identified offender and victim choose" to participate in a restorative
justice process, under the a conferencing model, the victim and
perpetrator would each bring a group of people most able to support
them for a face-to-face meeting.
For any of the Rocksprings injuries, the two groups would come
from different neighborhoods, as the gang members were identified
as coming from outside Rocksprings. The group could include, for
117. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4 1090, 1100.
118. See Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 15-16 (suggesting potential benefit of
restorative justice processes for factfinding even without clear admissions of guilt).
119. Under current systems, the vast majority of offenders plead guilty in exchange for
some benefit, usually a lesser sentence. See Nancy Jean King The American Jury, 62 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 41, 141 (1999). King uses figures showing that only 3-10% of felony
cases go to trial, and of those, more than one/third are adjudicated by a judge without a
jury. IL See also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
Many restorative justice programs offer the possibility of alternatives to incarceration as
an incentive to acknowledge guilt.
120. Many issues of coercion are inherent here, of course. See Brown, supra note 7, at
1265-72; Delgado, supra note 36, at 760-61.
121. The gang members targeted by most of the public nuisance injunctions live in the
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example, the victim with a spouse and a friend and the offender with
a parent and a teacher, or an uncle and a neighbor." The victim
would have an opportunity to tell the perpetrator the impact of the
lawbreaking and ask him or her to make amends. The perpetrator, in
front of a community of people who cared about him or her, would be
asked to take responsibility for the injuries inflicted and for making
amends." The exact process by which the perpetrator would make
amends would be negotiated by those present.
We might conclude that such a meeting, in isolation, in a
community with such terror and lawlessness, would offer no security
to the victim. Surely that is true 4.12 Any effective restorative justice
program in this context would have to include opportunities for
community members to work together to reduce the grip of the gang-
related drug trafficking and resultant violence. Social and political
movements-separate from the state-would have to be built to
create social disapprobation, or shame in Braithwaite's terms, for
harmful gang activity." A community movement bringing restorative
justice principles to preventive programs would provide context and
visibility beyond the individual meetings or conferences occasioned
by discrete incidents of law-breaking.2
Although the context is very different, similar goals animated a
set of self-regulatory programs in Australia by local citizens and pub
and club owners designed to reduce violence associated with the pubs
and clubs.2  As described by John Bralthwaite, the bartenders were
neighborhoods to which the injunctions apply.
122. For a detailed description of such a conference, see BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99,
at 317-19.
123. The conferencing model potentially avoids many of the important limitations of
one-on-one victim-offender mediation, such as those delineated in Delgado, supra note 36,
at 759-71.
124. Without the context of a coherent vision and implementation of restorative
justice, the benefits of isolated or peripheral restorative justice programs will be limited.
See Charles Tracy, Associate Editor's Editorial: The Promises and Perils of Restorative
Justice, 42 INT'L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275
(1998) (sermonizing against cooptation of restorative justice goals into dominant values
through subsidiary projects in danger of being overwhelmed by adversarial context).
125. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 75 ("the republican pursues the objective of
reducing crime with more of an eye to community organization than to criminal
enforcement").
126. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 57-94 (discussing need to support social
movements with egalitarian criminal justice agendas).
127. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737 (citing Ross Homel et al, Preventing Alcohol-
Related Crime Through Community Action: The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project, in
7 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 35 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1997)).
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taught peaceable techniques for defusing violence, responsible
serving practices to reduce drunkenness, and other measures."
During the project, assaults were reduced to less than half of previous
levels, but returned to normal when the project's funding ended and
ordinary policing techniques returned.'29 The community engagement
- including civilian responsibility for prevention and non-adversarial
violence reduction interventions - proved quite effective for general
deterrence and incapacitation goals.
Although Rocksprings' gang violence is certainly a different
problem than bar brawls, the concept of widespread community
peacekeeping training and interventions could be transferred to
communities being overtaken by gang violence. In its very persistence
and growth, gang crime reminds us of the human search for belonging
and community. The gang is itself a community, albeit often a
frightening, lawbreaking, violent, community. More importantly,
gang violence is perhaps the most disturbing and frightening in our
society today."3 Applying restorative justice principles to entrenched
gang violence is using a hard case to put forth a bold version of
restorative justice. Even if restorative justice conferences are not
suitable for homicides, the majority of identified gang members are
responsible for relatively less serious criminal activity. Using
restorative justice to address injuries caused by gang members could
help restorative justice to redirect criminal and juvenile justice policy,
not just become the less punitive alternative for the most privileged,
least frightening, offenders.'31
Even if we can begin to imagine a restorative justice approach to




130. Criminologist Jerome Miller points out that "[p]oliticians and human-service
professionals alike periodically call the public's attention to this ostensibly more unfeeling,
cold, and dangerous young offender who now stalks our streets." JEROME MILLER,
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 37-38 (1996); see also Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, supra note
42, at 112 (discussing widespread image of gang members as 'new breed' of amoral
animal).
131. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1282-85; Delgado, supra note 36, at 767-68; Tracy,
supra note 124 (arguing for transformative restorative justice, not peripheral alternative
programs).
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V. A Restorative Constitution
What would a Restorative Constitution look like? Is it possible
for our Constitution to offer the protection of restoration? As John
Braithwaite counsels, "If we take restorative justice seriously, it...
means transformed foundations of criminal jurisprudence and of our
notions of freedom, democracy, and community. 132 Does our
Constitution permit this transformation? Restorative justice
principles are assumed by most United States observers to raise
substantial and perhaps insurmountable constitutional concerns.'33
Any such accommodation requires breaking down the severely
individualistic, oppositional mode of constitutional criminal
procedural protection. The constitutionalized adversary system
would have to become the constitutionalized restorative system. A
Restorative Constitution would mean fundamental restructuring of
constitutional frameworks for the roles of the offender, the victim,
and the community consistent with restorative justice principles.
A. The Accused: Restorative Liberty of Accountability
The looming problem with a Restorative Constitution is the
potential loss of constitutional protections for the accused. Those
constitutional protections operate within the adversary system,
protecting the accused from the most powerful adversary, the state.
The constitutional protections fall within two main categories, the
right to equal treatment, and the right to liberty-based procedural
fairness. Restorative justice implicates both.
1. Equality
The state today is supposed to provide some protection against
private bias." Any system of justice that allows individual victims to
control the response to their injuries invites enormous differences in
punishment for apparently identical criminal behavior. The
inconsistency of individualized justice raises Eighth Amendment
proportionality35 and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection"
132. Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 2.
133. E.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1288-92; Delgado, supra note 36, especially at 760.
134. E.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1288; Delgado, supra note 36, at 759-60.
135. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment forbids extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate"
to the crime).
136. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that extending prison
sentence of convicted criminal unable to pay fine violates the Equal Protection Clause).
[Vol. 27.717
TOWARD RESTORATIVE CONSTITUTION
concerns. We can also easily understand that restorative justice could
yield to or even expand ever-present racial, class, or other types of
biases.137 Under a regimen of restorative justice conferences, for
example, different offenders who have committed acts that would be
classified as the same crime can receive very different responses and
demands from the victims. Given that racial and class-based
inequality in the criminal justice system is one motivation for a turn
toward restorative justice, questions about the potential inequalities
of restorative justice require a strong answer.
One answer is that robust equality should take account of
differences in the circumstances of criminal offenses."3 The impact of
criminal behavior-the injury caused-can be vastly different even for
acts constituting the same criminal offense. Equality based on
identical punishment for identical offenses rests on the fiction that
any aggravated assault reflects the same culpability or causes identical
harm, or that every three-year prison sentence imposes identical
hardship.139 Certainly, too, even the most rigid systems of determinate
sentencing, for example, are easily understood to embody class- and
race-based biases of the legislators or prosecutors; the gross
disparities in sentences between crack and powder cocaine famously
exemply blatant inequality embedded in apparently neutral rules"4
Ultimately, though, the only way to ensure that the informal
community mechanisms of restorative justice do not re-create or even
magnify private biases is to provide oversight of their results.
Records must be maintained, and individual agreed-upon atonement
activities would need to be rejected if they are unusually onerous. In
setting up restorative justice processes, the state has an obligation to
137. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 36, at 767-68. Victims privileged by class or race, for
example, could impose elevated demands, especially on offenders without those privileged
identities.
138. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 13-16 (1996).
139. Martin Wright makes this point, but in a way that arguably reflects class- or race-
bias, an easy failing when attempting to compare and contrast the relative hardship to
differently situated offenders of identical sentences. See MARTIN WRIGHT, RESTORING
RESPECT FOR JUSTICE: A SYMPOsIUM 147 (1999); see also Delgado, supra note 36
(warning about such bias).
140. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM. L. REv. 13 (1998); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: 'De-
Coding' Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J.
RACE & LAW 611 (2000); see generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 60 ("[E]ven
though the policy of just deserts is based on equal punishment for equal wrongs and
republicanism is not, it is republicanism that in practice can deliver more egalitarian
punishment practices. Because just deserts tend to be successfully imposed on the poor
and unsuccessfully on the rich...").
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enforce protections against gross disproportionality or ratification of
personal prejudice.14' In the same way that ordinary retributive
criminal sanctions provide a backdrop for motivating an offender to
engage in restorative justice programs, '  ordinary governmental
guarantees of equal protection should be fully applicable to vitiate
any restorative justice proceeding infected by gross disproportionality
or identified bias.'43
2. Liberty
The Constitution invites and at least partially enables the
accused to take on the role of adversary against the state, but it needs
fundamental reorientation to require or even support the role of
making amends. In its emphasis on an offender making amends to his
or her victim, restorative justice assumes that the offender is guilty.
Thus, restorative justice programs generally should not be used when
guilt is at issue. Most criminal defendants, however, plead guilty to
something."4
Consider the person who is in fact guilty of the charges against
him or her. What does the Constitution offer that person? The
accused's constitutional rights are the rights to resist the efforts of the
141. For a description of research needed to investigate bias in restorative justice
programs, see Mara F. Schiff, Restorative Justice Interventions for Juvenile Offenders: A
Research Agenda for the Next Decade, 1 WEST. CRIMINOL. REv. 1, 11 (1998) [online at
<http://wcr.sonoma.edulvlnl/vlnl.html>(visited Nov. 23, 2000)]; see also Delgado, supra
note 36, at 774 (urging critical oversight of restorative justice projects to reduce bias); see
generally Luke McNamara, Appellate Court Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing, 27 MANITOBA
L. J. 209 (2000) (describing Canadian appellate review of restorative justice circles).
142. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 81 ("[I]t would not serve the objective
of parsimonious punishment to abolish imprisonment altogether as a sentence for assault.
... [A] consequence of throwing away the big stick is that middle-sized sticks would be
used more often."); id. ("[C]redible criminal enforcement capability strengthens the hand
of communitarian crime control; it does not supplant it.").
143. Braithwaite acknowledges, "[w]hile it is a myth that centralized state law enabled
greater consistency and lesser partiality than community-based restorative justice, it is true
that abuse of power always was and still is common in community justice.... [S]tate
oversight of restorative justice in the community can be a check on abuse of rights in local
programs ... ." Id. at 334.
144. The vast majority of criminal cases are plea-bargained, through formal or
informal negotiations within the constraints of the legal system. See Fisher, supra note
199; King, supra note 119, at 141. In other words, to protect themselves, criminal
defendants admit wrong-doing, waiving many of their constitutional rights. The
constitutional rights become, thereby, bargaining chips, in an individual's fight against the
state (the community). This suggests that the vast majority of criminal cases could be
appropriate for restorative justice, even if limited to cases in which criminal defendants
admit guilt.
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state to deprive him or her of liberty.145 The constitutional procedural
protections in a very real sense offer the accused the opportunity to
try to avoid responsibility.
Under our current procedures, the accused is defensive and
isolated. From the moment of being charged by "the People," the
accused is granted defensive rights in an adversarial relationship
against the community. Our current criminal and juvenile justice
systems allow great integrity, resistance, and isolation. The right to
remain silent,"4 the due process right to be acquitted unless found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,147 and the panoply of constitutional
criminal protections are extreme manifestations of the right to be left
alone. The accused's liberty is understood as the negative freedom
not to be controlled by the state.
The Constitution is defensive, creating a protective shield around
an individual. In that sense, the autonomy values of the individual are
well-protected. The accused criminal is solitary, responsible only to
himself or herself. Even Gary Gilmore's mother had no standing to
challenge Utah's execution of him, to which he submitted voluntarily,
because she was a stranger to the proceedings.1" The criminal
defendant is the hyper-rugged individualist, although, ironically, the
flesh and blood person is easily obscured behind the rampant
individualism of universally-held individual rights.
The accused can stand apart, distant from the process as he or
she is being expelled from the community. Our ordinary criminal
procedures push suspects into the freedom that comes from being
forced into isolation in the name of individual rights. The rights of
juveniles as currently understood render them especially isolated,
adjudicated in private and secret proceedings. Accountability to the
victim and to the harmed communities is directly contrary to the
privacy-and isolation-of current juvenile processes.
The isolated trickster of current constitutional criminal
procedure is not the only concept of an autonomous person we can
imagine. Strip away entrenched concepts of the accused's
constitutional protections lying primarily in the opportunity to
145. On this negative liberty of dominant constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Susan
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990); David
Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTrrUTIONALISM 109-10 (1994).
146. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
147. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying the due process requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to juvenile delinquency adjudications).
148. See Ann Althouse, Standing in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177 (1991).
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attempt to avoid responsibility.
The tired concept of autonomous individuals fundamentally
needing and seeking a state of separation from others ignores the
equally central human goal of being connected. Feminist scholars,
including, most prominently in the legal academy, Robin West, offer
the central insight that perhaps a human struggle to be in relationship
is as great a need for full personhood as the liberal concept of the
right to be left alone.'49 To be fully human is to be in relationship.
We are trying to be connected. Perhaps in the context of wrongdoing,
being connected is being accountable.
What would restorative liberty look like? The fundamental
fairness principle of due process could be understood to be the
fundamental fairness of not isolating the accused from the
community, but instead offering the chance to be held responsible
and to make amends. Any meaningful restorative justice process
engages the offender instead of expelling him or her. In many ways,
the individual accused loses the right to isolation, but instead is
compelled into accountability to his or her victim and community.
This can be deeply invasive and demanding. But it is the kind of
demand we make of people with whom we have some sort of
relationship. It is the kind of demand that we make of ourselves.
Belonging in a community means some amount of acknowledgement
and even respect for others. 5 Personhood means being responsible to
the community in which one lives. Autonomy need not mean being
alone.' Being responsible to others for one's own actions is a crucial
part of autonomy." Being responsible is part of growing up.'
149. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1988)
("Women's concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy, individuality,
justice and rights, as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance,
community, responsibility and care."); see generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE
(1997).
150. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1012 ("Respect for others would seem to require that
when an offender has hurt someone, she should apologize to the extent that she feels at
fault.").
151. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE (1996).
"[A]utonomy cannot be achieved individually. In fact, we learn to become autonomous,
and we learn this competency not through isolation from others, but through relationships
with others. An individual's autonomy is nurtured through the care of others." Id at 24.
152. "In taking responsibility for one's decisions, one is autonomous." Id.; see also
Cohen, supra note 16, at 1021. "Within many religious and ethical systems, offering an
apology for one's wrongdoing is an important part of moral behavior, as is forgiving those
who have caused offense." Id. (footnote omitted).
153. Cf. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1010 (noting that attorneys rarely counsel their
clients to apologize, but "[i]f apology is often in the best interest of children, could it often
[Vol. 27:717
TOWARD RESTORATIVE CONSTITUTION
When something has gone wrong, when we have failed, when we
have injured someone else, suppressing that is a sign of bad mental,
emotional, and moral health. But the constitutional protections of
the criminal adversary system offer the defendant denial and
suppression. We might prefer community and accountability to
isolation and denial."54 Is there any such thing as liberty in the
protection of being held accountable? In a sense, it is the liberty
interest in being respected. It is the liberty interest in being seen, and
recognized as ourselves. It is the liberty interest in being understood
to be a member of the community.'55
Although this vision of the liberty in relationship, responsibility
and restoration is utterly contrary to current constitutional criminal
procedures, our Constitution provides several potential sources for its
support. Perhaps restorative justice requires a re-emphasis on the
meaning and primacy of the first three words of the Constitution,
"We, the People," as articulating a group identity and commitment to
community that is the foundation of all that follows. The republican
foundations of our constitution-especially the republican emphasis on
engaged deliberation-support the Restorative Constitution.'56 Almost
hidden behind the prominent isolated and individualistic defensive
rights of constitutional criminal procedure are several significant
guarantees of connection between the accused and his or her
community, including the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a
Grand Jury for capital or infamous crimes and the Sixth Amendment
rights to a public trial and an impartial jury. Interestingly, by its
literal language the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
guarantees the right of an accused "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him," language that in some ways suggests the
confrontation with the victim that is the heart of restorative justice
conferences."7
be in the best interest of adults?").
154. Cf. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1022 (stating that the "spiritual and psychological
benefits [of apologizing] may be central to a client's well-being, especially in the long run"
(footnote omitted)).
155. Cf. Currie, supra note 145, at 867-68 (discussing arguments for defining positive
liberty); WEST, supra note 145, at 149-51 (promoting First Amendment protection of
communication, not expression, as protecting community, not individual values).
156. See BRAITHWAITE & PETrIT, supra note 27; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 57-
85.
157. U.S. CONST. amend VI. One of the most significant modem aspects of the
Confrontation Clause is the right of the accused to confront his or her accusers through
cross-examination. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). But the language of the
Sixth Amendment is focused more clearly on the witness confronting the defendant, not
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Liberty-based concepts of personhood and individuation might
also provide some way to recognize the potential freedom and liberty
in being personally accountable, and challenged to offer redress, in
the service of community. In contrast to the constitutional criminal
protections that permit the accused to remain and hidden and
removed, the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized
consideration of a capital defendant prior to imposition of a death
sentence158 promotes an unusually prominent and robust concept of
the personhood of the criminal defendant. In Woodson v. North
Carolina,5 ' the Court held that North Carolina's mandatory capital
sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment in part because
of "its failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant
before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death." '  Woodson
thus stands as a monument against faceless, undifferentiated
defendants.
But the Woodson principle of individuation is recognized in the
context of a capital defendant's right to be presented as a full human
being in order to convince a jury to spare his life. My argument
moves in the opposite direction. Is there an interest of an accused in
being considered as a full human being for reasons other than to
reduce punishment? Is it possible to conceive of protecting
personhood by holding a criminal defendant accountable? Is it an
aspect of liberty to be held accountable for the injuries one inflicts,
rather than to be removed from the community? Conceiving of such
a liberty interest is almost, but not quite, impossible. Developing that
conception of liberty will be the key to making the Restorative
the defendant challenging the witness.
158. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 303. "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." Id. at 304. In Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978), following Woodson, the Court held, "the concept of individualized
sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally required, has long
been accepted in the country." Id. at 602. "[W]here sentencing discretion is granted, it
generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge's 'possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics' is '[h]ighly relevant-if not
essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate sentence...."' Id. at 602-03 (quoting




B. The Victim: Given a Restorative Voice
A crime is a public wrong, which is understood to mean that the
victim has no formal place in criminal law. The Constitution as
currently conceived offers nothing to the victim of crime. The
interests of the community, including the victim, are represented by
the state, or "The People."
The Restorative Constitution could draw on the work of
theorists who argue for a Constitution of affirmative duties, including
the duty to protect individuals not just from the harms inflicted by the
state, but also from harms inflicted by private entities."' In the
criminal adversary system, rights of victims are non-existent in part
because they are directly opposed to the constitutionally-protected
rights of the criminal defendant, and in part because the victim is
legally a stranger to the proceedings.
A restorative process in which the offender and the victim are
not completely or finally in opposition permits the victim a role and
authority without necessarily diminishing the rights of the offender.
Indeed, restorative justice processes can be understood as a
collaboration between the victim and the offender and their
respective supporters. In this context, acknowledging the interests of
the victim strengthens rather than hurts the offender.
The structure of an adversarial contest between the state and an
accused requires that the victim be an outsider to the process.
Communitarian and relational goals suggest that leaving the victim at
the periphery is a serious weakness of our adversarial criminal justice
system, that the community should take seriously the injury to the
victim, and that the state should not completely appropriate the
injury for societal goals. Restorative justice programs delegate
substantial authority to the victim to propose conditions by which the
offender may make amends. Of course, any delegation of authority to
victims to impose sanctions runs counter to our deeply held concepts
of the value of "neutral," disengaged decisionmakers 62 The tradition
of neutral, professional decisionmakers is especially entrenched in
juvenile courts, where judges, not juries, choose the controlling story.
We trust neutral, distanced decisionmakers, especially in juvenile
court, but perhaps engaged decisionmakers could offer better
161. See, e.g., Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1992).
162. See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kil" Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed
to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345,1381.
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outcomes in certain circumstances. Restorative justice offers the
promise of presenting both victim and offender as complex
individuals with multiple identities and valuable community ties."6
C. The Community: Embodied and Empowered
Our Constitution embodies liberal notions of individual rights
and autonomy values, with recognition of group rights or community
values noticeably absent, especially within the context of criminal
procedure. Restorative justice has a goal of involving members of the
community in understanding and redressing the harm caused by
criminal acts. But what is the community we are talking about?64
The unformed notion of the community is probably the most
romanticized aspect of restorative justice, 65 and perhaps of our
current criminal justice strategies as well.66  Defining the relevant
community with some precision and giving it real authority is surely
the key to nonsubordinating 67 and effective'8 restorative justice. A
163. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 67 ("Peacemaking does not demand that women
choose their identity as 'battered women' over other competing identities."); Meyer, supra
note 45, at 1524 (stating that the victim's forgiveness requires that "the victim herself be a
member of the community").
164. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1292 (challenging victim offender mediation as
invoking the interests of undefined or nonexistent communities); Harris, Environmental
Justice, supra note 41, at 1 (invoking model of environmental justice engagement with
community; questioning the location or identification of "community").
165. Donna Coker asks aptly, "[w]hy is it that we trust communities in the context of
restorative justice processes to invalidate the social beliefs that underpin battering
behavior more than we trust other community representatives like judges, police, and
juries?" Coker, supra note 19, at 96-97. Kathleen Daly asks "whether victim advocacy as
a vision of bottom up social transformation of law and social institutions will inevitably fall
victim to a more conservative law-and-order victim-centered advocacy." Daly, supra note
46, at 780; see Stuart A. Scheingold, Toska Olson, & Jana Pershing, Sexual Violence,
Victim Advocacy, and Republican Criminology: Washington State's Community Protection
Act, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 729 (1994) (using Washington data to suggest inconsistencies
between victims' goals and reintegrative principles).
166. See, e.g., Acuna, 14 Cal. 4!h 1090, 1102-03 (justifying anti-gang public nuisance
injunction on the basis of protection of "the community").
167. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 97 (suggesting that community engagement,
coupled with acknowledgement of community responsibility, could provide context and
process for addressing structural disparities in power of participants in Peacemaking);
Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410
(2000) (citing evidence of restorative justice programs facilitating "microcommunity
building").
168. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1292 (arguing that mediation works best in stable
social systems such as village and pastoral societies); Coker, supra note 19, at 98 (noting
the normative community for Navajo Peacemaking is relatively clear); McCold, supra note
38, at 91 (arguing that the nature of the community in restorative justice processes is
always "depend[ent] on the nature of the conflict"); McCold, supra note 38, at 92
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concrete, authoritative role for members of diverse and diffused
communities is especially important in light of the racialized criminal
justice system.169 A process that enables those closest to the crime,
both through proximity to the victim and proximity to the offender, to
participate in shaping the state's response, moves the role of the
community from the purely rhetorical to the real.
In abstract terms, typical juvenile and criminal justice
mechanisms are located within communities, both in terms of
geography and of constitutional structure and justification. The
community is represented in criminal justice through the range of
normal democratic mechanisms that control the government. The
police powers of the state rest in part upon the obligation to protect
the community, and our justice systems are justified by the need to
meet that goal. The fundamental concept of a crime as a public--not
personal--wrong means that some concept of community animates
criminal and juvenile proceedings. The "community" is well
represented in theory, by not only the prosecutor, but also the judge
and the jury-all different embodiments of the state.
The accused is at risk of being cast out of the community; thus
the community is understood to be in opposition to the accused. The
community is present in this very negative, exclusionary sense, as an
entity that, manifested by the prosecutor, representing the People, is
known to be judging and attempting to expel the accused. In some
sense, then, the community is well represented under the current
system.
In other ways, the community is absent. The community is either
narrowly represented by the state's representatives-prosecutor and
judge and perhaps jurors-or by broad, ungrounded references to
"the People." The exact membership of "the People" is unclear; in
literal terms, "the People" seems to include everyone in the
jurisdiction except the accused, who is the formal adversary of the
People. This formal structure undermines the community
involvement that might otherwise be found from the presence of a
(focusing on "local community"); McCold, supra note 38, at 94-95 (focusing on community
responsibility). But see Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law
Stop the Violence?, 50 CASE W. RES. 851, 865 n. 54 (2000) (noting that "the presence of a
sufficiently coherent and engaged community to have the capacity to reintegrate a
wrongdoer" is "precisely what is lacking" in "many circumstances of contemporary
violence").
169. Cf. Roberts, supra note 51, at 821 (noting that an important part of Black
liberation is an "increase [in] Black citizens' participation in constructing responses to
crime"); id. at 801 (criticizing the false dichotomy between law-abiding and lawless, and
the notion that police can tell them apart).
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victim, or a family member of the accused. As discussed above, in
formal terms the victim is simply a member of the People, as is, for
example, the accused's mother. The very abstract nature of the
community's presence, mediated by formal state structures, erases a
meaningful sense of community from criminal and juvenile justice
systems.
Any movement away from our current criminal justice
mechanisms, with these highly formal and diffused notions of
community, toward a system of concrete community presence
through the actual participation of community members, raises
potential constitutional concerns. The community is represented in
restorative justice programs by the moderator or mediator, by both
the victim and the accused, and by supporters of both. Although
nobody elected any of them to have any crime response function, the
constitutional issue of formal authority is easily answered by routine
mechanisms of delegation, such as through legislation authorizing
restorative justice programs.
The concrete community engagement in restorative justice
processes also has constitutional support in the structural themes of
deliberative democracy.70 The jury is the symbol of democracy within
the criminal justice system, but most adults accused of crime today
never see a jury, 7' and juvenile courts protect youthful offenders by
eliminating juries.' Restorative Constitutional processes arguably
promise nothing less than to make republicanism real,' and to
replenish deliberative democracy for communities, victims, and
offenders.
Conclusion
My willingness to risk much potential procedural protection in
170. Cf. AKIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997) (calling for interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
in light of the structure of the Constitution as a whole).
171. Nancy King reminds us that "for most defendants, the jury, if not irrelevant, is at
least inaccessible." King, supra note 119, at 141. Only 3-10% of felony cases go to trial,
and of those, more than one-third are adjudicated by a judge without a jury. Id; see also
Fisher, supra note 119, at 857 ("Bloodlessly and clandestinely, [plea bargaining] has swept
across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of
resistance").
172. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying to juveniles any
constitutional right to jury trials in delinquency proceedings, relying on the purported
differences between juvenile courts' treatment and criminal courts' punishment).
173. See generally BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 27.
[Vol. 27:717
the name of restorative justice is based, in part, on the recognition
that the actual protections of our individual rights systems are illusory
for many Americans.174 The Acuna decision upholding the anti-gang
public nuisance injunction in Rocksprings supports my skepticism
about unequal access to constitutional rights. Like many other
judicial decisionmakers, members of the California Supreme Court
believe that they know who is in the community, and who is in the
gang. Race, gender, and class form the basis of that knowledge.
Those constructed group identities are so strong that even in the
context of a constitutional system relentlessly based on defensive
individual rights, the Acuna decision sacrifices the right to be held
accountable for one's own acts in the name of the needs of "the
community." The frightening group identity of gang members seems
to wipe out entitlement to ordinary individual rights.
In many ways, the anti-gang public nuisance injunction is an
extreme example of an attempt to control violence through the
formal power of law. The injunction claims to punish and reduce
gang criminality by making virtually any activity by gang members
illegal. The legal document defining the gang to be a public nuisance
as a matter of law exalts the formality of law over practical reality.
Restorative justice relates to the law in the opposite direction.
Restorative justice starts with the injuries and the people involved,
and shifts the ground of engagement away from the formal processes
of law. The risks in such a shift are high. But the current criminal
and juvenile justice systems are seriously destructive of the interests
of the victims, the communities, and the offenders. Restorative
justice offers the possibility that We, the People, can do better.
174. See Delgado, supra note 36, at 771-72.
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